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Contiguous Territories: The Expanded Use of 
“Expedited Removal” in the Trump Era 
GEOFFREY A. HOFFMAN† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: “CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES” AS A LEGAL FICTION 
AND CONFLATION WITH TRADITIONAL EXPEDITED REMOVAL 
UNDER INA § 235 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) contains a little-
known provision that permits the physical return of individuals who 
enter from “contiguous territories” (i.e., Mexico or Canada) pending 
their removal proceedings before a United States immigration judge.1 
The statute, interestingly, only applies to those who enter from those 
countries, and there is no requirement that the person actually be a 
citizen or national of either Mexico or Canada.2 Furthermore, the 
provision is embedded within the “expedited removal” section, INA § 
235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225; but importantly, the person subjected to the 
contiguous territories provision is not “deported” immediately but 
made to wait outside the U.S. during his judicial removal proceedings.3 
There is thus a “legal fiction” created by the statutory scheme whereby 
a person is “in” the U.S. for purposes of jurisdiction over his or her 
INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. §1229a, removal proceedings, while technically 
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 1.  Immigration and Naturalization Act § 235(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (2012) 
(“aliens arriving from a contiguous territory” (i.e., Mexico or Canada) over a “land border” 
can be returned to the contiguous country pending removal proceedings here in the United 
States).  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
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and actually residing outside its territory.4 
This article considers salient legal problems that this statutory 
provision implicates. Serious problems arise upon a close examination 
of the “contiguous territories” provision. There is a dearth of authority 
interpreting the statute’s implementation which does not help matters. 
Moreover, it is also interesting that “contiguous territories” as a 
method for possible streamlining removal proceedings is situated 
within the statutory framework for “expedited removal” in INA § 235. 
Expedited removal, which enables certain classes of immigrants to be 
removed without the requirement or need for judicial oversight, 
previously has been limited by policy to those caught within 100 miles 
of the border to the U.S. and within fourteen days of their entry.5 
According to President Trump’s Executive Order 13767, expedited 
removal will now be expanded to include its full statutory limits, i.e. 
to the entire United States and applied to those found to have entered 
within the past two years.6   
Given the fact that the contiguous territories provision is found 
within the expedited removal section of the INA, there is every reason 
to believe that contiguous territories will be used in concert with, in 
lieu of, and as a back-up to expedited removal for those who may be 
encountered in the United States but who may not fall within the strict 
parameters required for traditional expedited removal.7 This 
“alternative” method of (temporary) removal could readily be applied 
to those who have entered from contiguous territories. The sweep of 
 
 4.  Legal fictions are ubiquitous in legal reasoning. A legal fiction has been defined as 
“[a]n assumption that something is true even though it may be untrue, made esp. in judicial 
reasoning to alter how a legal rule operates; specif., a device by which a legal rule or institution 
is diverted from its original purpose to accomplish indirectly some other object.” Legal 
Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Unfortunately, legal fictions may result 
in unfairness or unwarranted assumptions and may be dangerous when believed. See, e.g., 
Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 49 (2010). 
 5.  In 2004, DHS published notice in the Federal Register to expand the application of 
expedited removal to noncitizens who are encountered within 100 miles of the border and who 
entered the U.S. without inspection less than 14 days before the time they are encountered. 
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 C.F.R. § 48877–81 (2004); see also Nat’l 
Immigration Law Center, DHS Announces Latest in Series of Expedited Removal Expansions, 
20 IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS UPDATE 1 (Mar. 23, 2006). 
 6.  See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (commenting 
specifically on “contiguous territories”). 
 7.  Under the INA, to be placed into expedited removal, an arriving alien must be 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (2006) (fraud or misrepresentation) or under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2006) (no valid entry documents). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
While an exception exists for those who can show credible fear of removal, the person placed 
into expedited removal would still have to pass a credible fear interview to be entitled to 
“asylum-only” proceedings before the immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
(2012). 
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this provision poses the real danger of abuse, and, as argued herein, 
violates portions of the INA, domestic U.S. law, and U.S. international 
obligations, including duties owed to those seeking asylum or other 
humanitarian protections and especially duties owed to children 
encountered at or near the border. A host of scenarios present 
themselves where individuals could be immediately “returned” to the 
contiguous territories without clear instructions, or under a 
misimpression they have been actually deported and then barred from 
re-entry. Under these situations, the removal proceedings to which 
they are actually entitled would be rendered a mere nullity. They would 
be allegedly “awaiting” a proceeding outside the U.S. which could be 
completed without them were they not to show up for their hearing. If 
they for whatever reason do not appear on the appointed day for their 
hearing, an in absentia order of removal can be issued against them.8 
The text of the President’s executive order expanding expedited 
removal to the entire country and for those arriving aliens caught 
within two years from entry was operationalized in an implementing 
memorandum by then-Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
Secretary John Kelly.9 In that memorandum, former Secretary Kelly 
noted that INA § 235(b)(2)(C) permits the return of “aliens to 
contiguous countries.”10 In so doing, the Secretary opined that the 
rationale for the return pending “the outcome of removal proceedings 
saves the Department’s detention and adjudication resources for other 
priority aliens.”11 Importantly, the provision appears to be intended to 
be limited to those “aliens so apprehended who do not pose a risk of a 
subsequent illegal entry or attempted illegal entry. . . .”12 The 
memorandum also specifically addresses operationalization of the 
contiguous territories provision with respect to unaccompanied alien 
children (“UACs”), noting that as to those children the requirements 
 
 8.  Pursuant to Section 240(b)(5)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a person 
subject to an in absentia order has 180 days to attempt to reopen proceedings and rescind the 
order of removal. Such motion to reopen may be difficult to win since the burden is on the 
applicant to show “exceptional circumstances” for missing his or her hearing. Other options 
for reopening may also be available such as for lack of notice, changed country conditions, 
etc. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012). 
 9.  See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Commiss., U.S. Customs and Border Protection, et al. (Feb. 20, 2017) 
(available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-
Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf). 
 10.  Id. at 7. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
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of 8 U.S.C. § 1232 must be followed.13 Clearly, the provision is still to 
be applied to such children with the express proviso found in the 
memorandum that “the law and U.S. international treaty obligations” 
be followed and so long as the children pose “no risk of recidivism.”14  
A close reading of the memorandum of February 20, 2017 reveals 
a lot about how the contiguous territories provision is expected to be 
implemented. First, the provision is envisioned by the federal agency 
at issue,DHS, to be used on certain classes of undocumented 
immigrants and not others.15 The imposition of the phrase “who do not 
pose a risk of a subsequent illegal entry or attempted illegal entry” tells 
us that the agency (at least from the point of view of the publicly 
available policy) does not apparently want to utilize the provision for 
individuals with a high risk of illegal re-entry. It begs the question how 
the agency is going to determine this issue. It also is problematic in 
that people may not be given any choice in the matter. When an 
individual is not given a preference, they may be forcibly returned to a 
contiguous territory where they could be subjected to persecution, 
crime, homelessness or, worse for some, expulsion back to their point 
of origin to face persecution there. 
It is troubling that the implementing memorandum contains 
absolutely no discussion of safeguards in the neighboring country for 
those who are returned pending removal.16 The lack of safeguards, such 
as adequate housing, protection, access to counsel, food or other 
procedural protections are missing. With respect to the nature of the 
removal proceedings which will be available to the returned person, 
there is mention of the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
consulting with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement “to establish a functional, interoperable 
video teleconference system to ensure maximum capability to conduct 
video teleconference removal hearings for those aliens so returned to 
the contiguous country.”17 The inclusion of video equipment means 
that the future removal hearings do not have to be held in any 
established immigration court location, but could be held anywhere 
that video equipment is available. Such mobility implies that the 
hearings in such cases may be held at the border itself where 
presumably the returned immigrant’s fate would be decided without 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  See generally id. 
 17.  Id. at 7. 
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their ever having to be officially “re-entered” into the United States. 
As noted by at least one commentator, the return of a person to 
the contiguous territory, e.g., Mexico, pending further proceedings 
leads to three logical possibilities: (1) the person is a citizen of Mexico, 
(2) the person is a citizen of some third country but has valid 
immigration status in Mexico; or (3) the person is a citizen of some 
third country but lacks valid immigration status in Mexico.18 In the first 
and third cases, according to the blog, the returning of the person to 
Mexico under these circumstances would be “deeply problematic.”19 
As will be discussed in a further section of this article, the provision if 
utilized in this deleterious way could violate U.S. treaty obligations, 
such as the 1987 U.N. Convention Against Torture (the U.S. is a state 
party), 1967 Protocols relating to the Status of Refugees (the U.S. is a 
state party), among other international instruments and norms, as well 
as portions of U.S. domestic law, most notably INA § 241(b)(3), 
relating to mandatory withholding of removal for those whose life or 
freedom would be threatened (enshrining the principle of non-
refoulement). 
A similar point also was made by the Harvard Immigration and 
Refugee Clinical Program, in a monograph discussing the impact of 
President Trump’s executive orders on asylum seekers.20 As explained 
in that paper, the principle of non-refoulement states that “No 
Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”21 The Harvard Clinic noted that the implementation of the 
President’s executive order, in section 7, is unclear and 
implementation would require cooperation from Mexico and Canada.22 
Furthermore, they note that in the event the U.S. sends “asylum seekers 
back to Mexico pending a formal removal proceeding, there is 
significant likelihood that Mexico would send those asylum seekers 
 
 18.  David Isaacson, Destroying the Case in order to Save It, THE INSIGHTFUL 
IMMIGRATION BLOG (Feb. 28, 2017), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2017/02/destroying-the-
case-in-order-to-save-it-why-returning-asylum-applicants-to-contiguous-territory-under-ina-
§235b2c-would-often-violate-both-law-and-common-sense.html. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See Amy Volz, et al., The Impact of President Trump’s Executive Orders on Asylum 
Seekers, HARV. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM (2017), 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Report-Impact-of-Trump-
Executive-Orders-on-Asylum-Seekers.pdf. 
 21.  Id. at 6–7 (citing Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention). 
 22.  Id. at 7. 
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back to their countries of origin.”23 The monograph then goes on to cite 
statistics showing an increase in deportations from Mexico, and 
especially to countries in the Central American northern triangle 
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.24 “Lawyers have 
noted multiple violations of due process for asylum seekers in Mexico; 
crime against migrants (including human trafficking, kidnapping, and 
rape) is widespread and largely goes unprosecuted.25 
A final point to notice by way of introduction is that the 
contiguous territories provision contains no express time or 
geographical limitation found in the INA. Even the related expedited 
removal provisions for those found to have entered without inspection 
without valid entry documents or through fraud or misrepresentation 
are limited to those found within the U.S. within two years.26 Since no 
limit exists on the contiguous territories provision, it is possible that 
DHS could return those found within the U.S. who are deemed to be 
“arriving aliens” even where a person has actually been in the country 
far longer than the two-year period. It is problematic furthermore 
because those who are caught within the U.S. and who entered from a 
contiguous territory (no matter when they entered) may now 
presumably be “returned” immediately to Mexico without seeing an 
immigration judge and without the possibility of any protection in the 
neighboring country, a place they may fear persecution, or where they 
have little or no connection and no way to support themselves while 
awaiting a future hearing which may be wholly inaccessible to them. 
II. POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGES IN UNITED STATES FEDERAL 
COURTS 
A. Habeas Corpus and the Real ID Act of 2005 – limits imposed 
on habeas by the INA  
Petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus presents one way to seek 
to remedy the use or abuse of the contiguous territories provision. 
Necessarily, any immigrant’s options for relief in this regard are going 
to be severely limited by several factors. First, the person may be no 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 8. 
 25.  Id. (citing Mexico Now Detains More Central American Migrants than the United 
States, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (June 11, 2015), 
https://www.wola.org/2015/06/mexico-now-detains-more-central-american-migrants-than-
the-united-states/). 
 26.  Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) 
(2012). 
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longer present in the U.S. Second, she may lack access to counsel, and 
especially counsel who are able to navigate federal court procedures 
required to seek to enjoin the Department of Homeland Security from 
“returning” an arriving alien to a contiguous territory under the INA. 
Furthermore, there are various sections of the INA which limit 
jurisdiction in federal district court, following the Real ID Act of 
2005.27 INA § 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252] has provisions which restrict 
courts from even hearing actions to challenge expedited removal 
proceedings, more generally. In the words of the statute, “no court shall 
have jurisdiction to review . . . any individual determination or to 
entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the 
implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to [8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)] . . . .”28 Because the contiguous territories 
provision is in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) and not 1225(b)(1), then the 
restriction on judicial review (at least with respect to this limiting 
statutory provision) should not be used as a valid reason to restrict 
judicial review over a contiguous territories claim.29 
As the Real ID Act of 2005 made clear, federal district courts no 
longer have jurisdiction over challenges to final orders of removal.30 
Instead, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), petitioners must exhaust their 
administrative remedies before the immigration judge (“IJ”) and Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and then bring a challenge in the form 
of a petition for review to a final order exclusively in the circuit court 
of appeals. Unfortunately, this jurisdiction-stripping provision often 
means that petitioners will have to await a remedy to their 
constitutional challenges until the appropriate circuit court of appeals 
reviews their case. Many times, however, a “victory” at the circuit 
court level may be an illusory one where the petitioner has already 
been deported and cannot be found or is unable to return to the U.S.31 
The jurisdiction-stripping provision, in 8 U.S.C. § 1252, does not 
 
 27.  The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005), imposed limits 
on habeas jurisdiction in federal court, making petitions for review in the circuit courts of 
appeals the exclusive means of challenging a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), 
discussed more in depth infra Part II (B).  
 28.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 29.  Even in cases involving expedited removal orders, petitioners are still entitled to 
judicial review over three issues: (1) whether the petition is an alien; (2) was ordered removed; 
(3) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence,” admitted as a refugee,” or granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(e)(2)(A–C) (2012). 
 30.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012). 
 31.  See Geoffrey A. Hoffman, et al., Immigration Appellate Litigation Post-Deportation: 
A Humanitarian Conundrum, 5 HOUSTON L. REV.-E.: OFF THE RECORD 143 (2015). 
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foreclose all habeas cases since they still can be brought to challenge 
the conditions of, and the reasons for, a person’s confinement if in 
violation of law. If a person is being held “in custody” by the federal 
government in violation of a federal statute or the United States 
Constitution, then habeas may permit a federal district court to remedy 
the violation.32 The argument will turn on whether a federal court will 
exercise jurisdiction over a person who has been “returned” (or about 
to be returned) to a contiguous territory. One issue will be whether that 
person is still “in custody” for purposes of habeas jurisdiction. Given 
how expansively the definition of “in custody” has been interpreted, 
there should be no question that such an immigrant is “in custody” for 
purposes of a valid habeas claim.33 Another issue may be the 
appropriate venue in cases where an immigrant is returned and no 
longer in the United States. Given the flexibility of the venue rules 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1291 this also should not present a significant 
obstacle to federal court jurisdiction.34 
Even though federal courts do have jurisdiction over such cases, 
the government may argue that another section of the judicial review 
statute should be held to prevent any federal court review whatsoever. 
Under INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the government in federal 
court may attempt to obtain a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction 
under the jurisdiction-stripping provision in INA § 242(g). In the 
words of this limitation on judicial review, “no court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien 
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders 
against any alien under this chapter.”35 In that provision, the key terms 
“commence proceedings” “adjudicate cases” and “execute removal 
proceedings” have been narrowly construed so that the applicability of 
§ 242(g) to foreclose review is not always applicable.36 In addition, the 
 
 32.  See Judicial Review Provision of the Real ID Act, LEGAL ACTION CTR. – AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL (June 7, 2005), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/realid670
5.pdf. 
 33.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 437 (2004) (“[O]ur understanding of custody 
has broadened to include restraints short of physical confinement”); see also Introduction to 
Habeas Corpus, LEGAL ACTION CTR. – AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 2008), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/lac_pa_04
06.pdf. 
 34.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2006) (providing for venue in case in which defendant is 
officer or employee of federal government). 
 35.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012). 
 36.  According to one commentator, “[o]n its face, section 242(g) appears broad, as to 
abolish judicial review of practically every claim of a noncitizen challenging aspects of his 
detention or removal not specifically authorized under the INA. However, IIRIRA’s legislative 
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use of a “return” to contiguous territories while removal proceedings 
are pending does not obviously fall within any one of these three 
categories. Therefore, a federal district court should not be persuaded 
to dismiss a challenge on this basis. 
Under INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, there is a further way to 
challenge a return to a contiguous territory while removal proceedings 
are pending. Although challenges to individual cases where expedited 
removal has been ordered are severely circumscribed by the INA, there 
is a category of cases specifically allowed for in the INA relating to 
judicial review over “challenges to the validity of the system.” Section 
242(e)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(e)(3), specifically allows for 
review of determinations under “§ 1225(b)” – note it is not limited to 
(b)(1) but applies to all subsections including contiguous territories 
determinations – and “its implementation.”37 Such cases are brought in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.38 The deadline for 
bringing such an action is expressly set forth in the statute: “Any action 
instituted under this paragraph must be filed no later than 60 days after 
the date the challenged section, regulation, directive, guideline, or 
procedure.…”39 
B. Circuit Court Petition for Review as exclusive means of 
challenging a final order of removal under INA § 
242(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) 
Given that federal courts of appeals are now the exclusive means 
of addressing challenges to final orders of removal, as we have seen, a 
contiguous territories challenge in federal district court must be framed 
carefully in such a way that the petitioner is not challenging the 
underlying removal proceeding or a final order of removal. Courts 
have found jurisdiction in a variety of habeas cases even where the 
removal proceedings are still ongoing and prior to the issuance of a 
final order of removal.40 Moreover, a person who has been or is about 
to be “returned” to a contiguous territory will have a variety of 
Constitutional and/or statutory claims, see infra Part II(D) and (E), 
 
history demonstrates that Congress never intended for section 242(g) to strip federal court 
jurisdiction over damages actions brought by noncitizens against immigration officials.” 
Sameer Ahmed, INA Section 242(g): Immigration Agents, Immunity, and Damage Suits, 119 
YALE L.J. 625, 627 (2009). 
 37.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A) (2012). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(B) (2012). 
 40.  See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 1652–59 (15th 
ed. 2016) (discussing cases); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15–1204 (S. Ct. Feb. 27, 
2018). 
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because they will be severely hampered in their ability to fully litigate 
their case in a removal proceeding. Issues will arise impacting access 
to counsel, evidence, or witnesses, as well as the safety and well-being 
of a petitioner who is residing in a foreign country without housing, 
employment, or the ability to feed themselves or their children.  
A contiguous territories challenge has rarely if ever been made, 
either as a part of a final order review (i.e., petition for review) in the 
circuit courts or as a habeas proceeding in the district courts.41 The only 
discussion of contiguous territories in any case – reported or 
unreported—was in an unpublished BIA case. In Matter of Nuzaira 
Mahfuz aka Nuzaira Mahfuz Rahman, 2011 WL 1373407 (BIA Mar. 
28, 2011), the respondent had been placed into removal proceedings 
but then returned to Canada at the land border in Niagara Falls, New 
York.42 The respondent failed to appear for the removal hearing and 
was ordered removed in absentia. In that case, respondent relied upon 
Matter of Sanchez, 21 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 1996) for the proposition 
that there are no time limits on her motion to reopen in exclusion 
proceedings.43 However, the BIA distinguished Sanchez as that case 
dealt with exclusion proceedings, not removal proceedings, and the 
exception for time limits for motions to reopen in that context was not 
applicable for those in present-day removal. 
Importantly, as confirmed in the John Kelly memorandum dated 
February 20, 2017, discussed supra, those who are subjected to 
contiguous territories return will be placed in INA § 240 removal 
proceedings, just like Ms. Mahfuz.44 The Board has thus already shown 
its unwillingness to consider a challenge by someone who has been 
returned to the contiguous territory from which they have come. 
Although the procedural history is not very well developed in Matter 
of Mahfuz, it is apparent that the respondent in that case was 
 
 41.  The research has uncovered only one case, discussed infra, In re: Nuzaira Mahfuz 
a.k.a. Nuzaira Rahman, No. A076-492-135, 2011 WL 1373407 (BIA Mar. 28, 2011) 
(involving a return to Canada). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  The modes of removal of a person from the U.S. used to be divided into two separate 
types of proceedings: “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings. Now, the unitary system is 
“removal” and generally speaking there are no longer “exclusion” proceedings in the 
immigration court, with rare exceptions. See Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. 
SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/deportation (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) 
(explaining that “[p]rior to April 1997 deportation and exclusion were separate removal 
procedures. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
consolidated these procedures. After April 1, 1997, aliens in and admitted to the United States 
may be subject to removal based on deportability. Now called Removal, this function is 
managed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.”). 
 44.  See In re: Nuzaira Mahfuz, supra note 41. 
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complaining about her departure from the U.S. under the INA § 
235(b)(2)(C) process. The decision does not reveal what her arguments 
were for missing her court date or whether it was because of lack of 
notice or some other issue such as “exceptional circumstances.”45 
Assuming she did have actual notice of the hearing date, the 
respondent could have successfully reopened her case in the event she 
had shown some “exceptional circumstance” within 180 days of 
issuance of the order as required to prevail on a motion to reopen in 
absentia.46 According to the Board, she missed the deadline and the 
Board refused to reopen her case. One interpretation of this decision is 
that the Board (at least in an unpublished decision as a result of a 
motion to reconsider) will not view return to a contiguous country in 
and of itself as an “exceptional circumstance.” 
C. Limited Authority of the Immigration Judges and Board of 
Immigration Appeals to provide redress 
There is unfortunately a dearth of legal precedents to help guide 
litigants who wish to challenge the contiguous territories provision. 
However, one thing we do know is that the IJs and the BIA do not have 
authority (generally speaking) to address Constitutional questions 
because they do not represent Article III courts.47 For example, as the 
leading sourcebook for immigration law reports, “the BIA generally 
will not rule on the constitutionality of the statute/regulations that it 
administers.”48 This inability of the immigration courts and the Board 
to address Constitutional questions does have a loophole. Although the 
Board may not find a statute unconstitutional in the first place, that 
does not mean that it may apply a statute found unconstitutional by 
federal courts.49 Likewise, the Board is permitted to construe statutes 
to avoid Constitutional problems.50 Additionally, where the Board can 
effectuate a remedy of a Constitutional violation, for example 
ineffective assistance or other violation of due process under the Fifth 
Amendment, it can and does do so by remanding the case back to the 
 
 45.  See supra note 8 (discussing 180 day rule and exceptional circumstances for 
reopening of in absentia order). 
 46.  Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2012) (reopening may be granted if “exceptional 
circumstances” are shown within 180 days of an in absentia order). 
 47.  Immigration judges and the BIA are not, in point of fact, Article I courts either, but 
instead employees of the Department of Justice (DOJ). See About the Office, THE U.S DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last visited on Apr. 20, 2018). 
 48.  KURZBAN, supra note 40, at 1584 (citing Matter of U-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 327 (BIA 
1991), among other cases). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
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immigration judge.51 
The doctrine which prevents administrative bodies from 
adjudicating the Constitutionality of the INA, the Board’s own 
governing statute, has real ramifications for a contiguous territories 
challenge. What it means is that the IJ and the Board will not be able 
to find INA § 235(b)(2)(C) unconstitutional as applied to those 
respondents who are arguing that the implementation of this provision 
somehow hindered or even disabled the defenses in their removal case. 
This fact should be emphasized to a federal district judge in the habeas 
context. It will mean that the district court cannot require a petitioner 
in federal court to exhaust their administrative remedies by attempting 
to bring this issue up with the IJ or the BIA in the first instance.52 An 
exception to the exhaustion doctrine would clearly be applicable: 
futility.53 It would be futile for a litigant to raise the issue with the IJ 
and the Board where both are unable to adjudicate the question of the 
INA § 235(b)(2)(C)’s constitutionality. Given the inability of the IJ 
and the BIA to address these issues, we now turn to possible 
Constitutional claims that may be raised in a potential federal court 
action. 
D. Procedural and Substantive Due Process Claims; other 
constitutional claims  
The most salient challenge to the contiguous territories provision 
will be under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and implicate 
either procedural and/or substantive due process. Due process is 
guaranteed to respondents in INA § 240 removal proceedings.54 
Importantly, the procedural due process guarantee of a full and fair 
hearing in removal proceedings has been well-spelled out in prior 
cases.55 A respondent is permitted access to counsel of her choosing 
but not paid for by the government, as well as evidence used against 
her, the ability to call witnesses and reserve appeal.56 In the old case, 
United States ex rel. Mezei, the Supreme Court had held that an 
immigrant at the border is entitled to no procedural due process rights 
 
 51.  See Seeking Remedies for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Cases, 
AM. IMMIGR. COUNSEL (Jan. 19, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/seeking-remedies-ineffective-
assistance-counsel-immigration-cases (discussing remedies for ineffective assistance claims). 
 52.  See KURZBAN, supra note 40, at 1662–63, 1707–25 (discussing exhaustion). 
 53.  Id. at 1722 (discussing futility doctrine and citing cases). 
 54.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 
 55.  See KURZBAN, supra note 40, at 391–99. 
 56.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012) (listing rights of respondents in removal 
proceedings). 
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beyond what the statute provides for and where he is denied entry.57 
However, Mezei does not apply to respondents in INA § 240 
proceedings. In any event the court itself in Mezei, even where it 
denied procedural due process to the immigrant in exclusion 
proceedings, nevertheless confirmed the availability of habeas corpus 
to challenge the validity of his exclusion from the United States.58 
Not just procedural but substantive due process may also be 
implicated by the contiguous territories provision. Substantive due 
process doctrine protects those whose fundamental rights are violated 
by governmental conduct. The basis for substantive due process is in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and prohibits the government 
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”59 Respondents who are subjected to the return 
provision by the federal government could potentially make out a 
claim under substantive due process. Perhaps the strongest such case 
would be where the litigant could show for example that their asylum 
claim was based on past persecution or fear of future persecution from 
Mexico (or a third country) and they would not be able to avail 
themselves of the protection of Mexico or the third country while 
awaiting removal proceedings in the U.S. 
Another potential Constitutional claim will involve equal 
protection. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state may treat 
persons who are similarly situated unequally under the law.60 With 
respect to the federal government, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
federal government likewise from engaging in discrimination where it 
would be so unjustifiable that it violates due process.61 A litigant in 
federal court could also make an equal protection claim against the 
federal government’s implementation of the contiguous territories 
provision. A class of persons, those arriving aliens subjected to INA § 
235(b)(2)(C), are being returned or threatened to be returned where 
others “similarly situated” are in the exact same circumstances 
(arriving from Mexico or Canada) but are not returned. The protected 
class awaits their hearing date in a United States detention facility. The 
discriminatory nature of the contiguous territories provision may be 
evidenced by the February 20, 2017 implementing memorandum from 
DHS. In that memo, as discussed, supra, those who will be “returned” 
must be found to be at a low risk for illegal re-entry. This sets up an 
 
 57.  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953). 
 58.  Id. at 213. 
 59.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 60.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 61.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
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unfair dichotomy where, on the one hand, those who are seen as least 
culpable are subjected to return, while those who may (allegedly) be 
more culpable are taken out of the contiguous territories provision. 
Those persons are provided with the ability to stay in the U.S. while 
awaiting their removal proceedings. 
E. Administrative Procedure Act / Declaratory Judgment/ 
Mandamus and other forms of federal court actions 
including federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 
In addition to and as a part of the habeas petition, there may be 
asserted other claims in the context of a challenge to the contiguous 
territories provision. Habeas is available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
and, as mentioned, extends to a prisoner who is “in custody under or 
by color of the authority of the United States” and in violation of “the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”62 In conjunction 
with this statute, petitioners will want to invoke the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which provides in pertinent part that 
“any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party . . . whether or not further relief 
is or could be sought.” The statute also provides, “Any such declaration 
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall 
be reviewable as such.” While declaratory judgment does not provide 
independent jurisdiction, it can and should be used to request that the 
federal district court declare the contiguous territories statute 
unconstitutional either as applied or on its face.63 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) also does not provide 
independent jurisdiction, but nevertheless can be used in conjunction 
with a habeas claim.64 In the context of a challenge to the contiguous 
territories provision, the APA can be utilized because it redresses the 
suffering “of a legal wrong due to agency action or adversely affected 
by agency action.”65 According to the APA, the reviewing court may 
compel agency action that is “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed.”66 Also, the APA addresses agency action which is “arbitrary, 
 
 62.  28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
 63.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2010) (providing that further 
necessary and proper relief may be granted based on a declaratory judgment). 
 64.  Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 894 (1960); see also Alfred L. Scanlan, Judicial Review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act—In Which Judicial Offspring Receive a Congressional Confirmation, 23 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 501, 514 (1948). 
 65.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2011). 
 66.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;” “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;” 
“in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right;” “without observance of procedure required by law;” 
or “unsupported by substantial evidence.”67 
Finally, the federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, must also be invoked because the utilization of INA § 
235(b)(2)(C) to return persons to contiguous territories does present a 
federal question regarding the constitutionality of a federal statute. 
Federal question jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear a case where 
the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the Constitution, a federal law, 
or a treaty to which the United States is a party.68 As will be discussed 
in Part III, infra, there are several possible international legal 
instruments, as well as domestic laws, which could be implicated and 
can also serve to support federal question jurisdiction.69 The plaintiff 
will allege that the return provision of § 235(b)(2)(C) conflicts with the 
safeguards provided for in the INA and associated regulations which 
protect respondents in removal proceedings. These include for 
example the right to counsel of their choosing not paid for by the 
government, the right to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, 
and present their case in a full and fair hearing consistent with due 
process of law.70 The plaintiff may also allege, as will be discussed, 
that other parts of the INA, and/or other federal laws, may be violated 
by the forcible returning of arriving aliens to contiguous territories. 
III. OTHER ISSUES IMPACTING IMMIGRANTS SUBJECTED TO THE 
CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES PROVISION IN INA § 235  
A. International legal Authority 
Having now discussed considerations relating to the jurisdictional 
and procedural aspects of bringing a claim to challenge returns to 
contiguous territories, we now turn to potential substantive legal 
 
 67.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 68.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  
 69.  Not all international treaties are self-executing. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP 
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1025 (2d ed. 
2000). If not self-executing, they would need to have domestic implementing legislation to 
provide a cause of action in U.S. federal district courts or a cause of action could be asserted 
more generally under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (1946).  
 70.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012) (“Aliens rights in proceedings”); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§1240.10(a)(1) (2005) (“In a removal proceeding, the immigration judge shall . . . [a]dvise the 
respondent of his or her right to representation at no expense to the government, by counsel of 
his or her choice.”).  
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authorities which can be harnessed to support such a challenge. Since 
the contiguous territories provision necessarily involves another 
country, i.e. Mexico or Canada, the first place to look would be to 
international legal authorities that protect migrants and to which the 
United States is a party or has some significant interest. International 
treaties, as apparent from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, have the force of law and 
may provide the basis for federal court jurisdiction if self-executing or 
where implementing domestic legislation exists.71 Furthermore, under 
the Charming Betsy principle of interpretation, domestic statutes must 
be interpreted in such a way that they do not conflict with international 
law.72  
The international treaties potentially implicated include the 1987 
U.N. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)73 (U.S. is a state party), as 
well as the 1967 Protocols relating to the Status of Refugees74 (U.S. is 
a state party). Other possible authorities to be aware of and explore 
would be the 1991 International Convention on the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers75 (ratified by Mexico, but unfortunately, not by the 
U.S.); the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination76 (U.S. does not accept competence 
under Art. 14) and the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights77 (“ICCPR”, ratified by U.S. but with a number of 
reservations); the U.N. Charter;78 the Universal Declaration of the 
rights of Man;79 and the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child80 (U.S. is a state party).  Moreover, there exist 
various local repatriation agreements executed by both U.S. and 
Mexican government officials, which attempt to ensure the protection 
 
 71.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 72.  Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).  
 73.  G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984).  
 74.  Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 Stat. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267. 
 75.  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2003). 
 76.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. 
 77.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (the provisions of Art. 41 (Human Rights Committee) entered into force Mar. 28, 1979) 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  
 78.  Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993. 
 79.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).  
 80.  G.A. Res. 54/263 A, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (May 25, 2000). 
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of Mexican citizens being returned to Mexico.81 
First and foremost, returning those who are not Mexican nationals 
and who do not have any valid immigration status in Mexico would be 
most problematic. Such returns would arguably violate CAT and the 
1967 Protocols relating to the Status of Refugees for those returnees 
who are seeking asylum or other humanitarian types of relief in the 
U.S. Article 3 of the CAT prohibits the United States from returning, 
extraditing or refouling a person to any state, “where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”82 The Committee Against Torture, which 
oversees implementation of the CAT, has determined that the danger 
must be assessed not just for the initial receiving state, but also with 
regard to any other states to which the person may be subsequently 
“expelled, returned or extradited.”83 CAT is implemented in the U.S. 
by federal regulation and is a mandatory form of relief for immigrants 
who can prove that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be 
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”84 Mexico is 
also a state party to the Convention.85 
In addition, the 1967 Protocols implement Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention, which enshrines the principle of non-refoulement. This is 
a principle of international law that prevents a country in which a 
person is seeking asylum from returning them to a country they would 
be in danger of persecution on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”86 This 
international legal principle to which the United States is bound is 
included also within our domestic law, specifically INA § 241(b)(3). 
That section provides that with certain exceptions, “the Attorney 
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General 
decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that 
country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership 
 
 81.  The United States Department of Homeland Security website references nine (9) 
local bilateral agreements, and provides links to each agreement. See Updated U.S.-Mexico 
Local Repatriation Arrangements, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/updated-us-mexico-local-repatriation-arrangements (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2018).  
 82.  G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 73, at Art. 3. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2002). 
 85.  See Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard, UNHCR (Jan. 24, 2018), 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (providing a list of countries who have ratified).  
 86.  Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 74.  
HOFFMAN - CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:33 PM 
2018] THE EXPANDED USE OF “EXPEDITED REMOVAL” 285 
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”87 
The 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child also may provide some basis for international legal authority 
where juveniles are returned or threatened to be returned to a 
contiguous territory.88 This is because the U.S. is a party, and Article 6 
provides that “[e]ach State Party shall take all necessary legal, 
administrative and other measures to ensure the effective 
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this Protocol 
within its jurisdiction.”89 To the extent that children who are returned 
are subject to trafficking, prostitution, slavery and other forms of abuse 
or persecution, the 2002 Optional Protocol would be violated. If the 
United States has no safeguards in the contiguous country to which 
children are being returned, the 2002 Optional Protocol may provide 
an additional argument supporting relief in federal court. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), of which the U.S. is a party, could also provide legal 
authority, with the important caveat that the U.S. has made many 
reservations in terms of the applicability of the covenant’s provisions.90 
With respect to Article 6(1), for example, the ICCPR provides that 
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law.91 No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”92 
Article 7 also protects against “the subjection to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.” 93 Article 12(1) provides that 
“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence.”94 An asylum seeker may be able to rely on Article 12(1) to 
assert liberty of movement and argue they should not be forcibly 
returned to a contiguous country pending removal proceedings. Article 
13 provides that an alien lawfully in a territory may be expelled only 
“in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law.” 95 
B. Potential Conflicts with other domestic U.S. statutory 
 
 87.  Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). 
 88.  G.A. Res. 54/263 A, supra note 80.  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See ICCPR, supra note 77.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
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provisions  
The Immigration and Nationality Act protects respondents in 
removal proceedings.96 Clearly, the use of returns under INA § 
235(b)(2)(C) could violate those provisions where respondents are 
foreclosed from access to evidence, witnesses, counsel or other 
resources here in the United States. As discussed, the portions of the 
INA which protect asylum seekers and those who fear persecution, see 
INA § 208; 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and the 
associated regulations, also would be violated by the use of the 
contiguous territories provision against those who fear return to their 
home countries based on persecution and torture. Even if the asylum 
claim does not originate from Mexico, but from a third country, there 
is considerable danger of a person being deported by the Mexican 
authorities without due process, as recognized in the Harvard Clinical 
Program study, mentioned supra.97 
Additionally, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) protects unaccompanied 
alien children, and would be violated if juveniles are returned under 
INA § 235(b)(2)(C) without regard to the TVPRA’s protections.98 
Then-Secretary Kelly, it is important to note, specifically mentioned in 
the DHS implementing memorandum that the return provisions under 
INA § 235(b)(2)(C) must be implemented “to the extent otherwise 
consistent with the law and U.S. international treaty obligations.”99 
Moreover, pursuant to the “Flores Settlement,” see Flores v. Reno, 
Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D. CA 1997), children who are in 
detention in the United States must be held in the “least restrictive 
setting.”100 Flores also requires that that juveniles be released from 
custody “without unnecessary delay” to a parent, legal guardian, or 
adult relative.101 Clearly, therefore, by implementing the return the 
provision in a way that prevents children from being released to adult 
relatives or other appropriate care providers here in the U.S. would 
violate Flores v. Reno. 
Finally, INA § 235(b)(2) contiguous territories provision violates 
potentially all parts of the INA which provide relief from removal and 
 
 96.  See supra notes 56, 70 and accompanying text (discussing Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012)). 
 97.  See Volz, et al., supra note 20. 
 98.  William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) [hereinafter TCPRA 2008]. 
 99.  Memorandum from John Kelly, supra note 9.  
 100.  TVPRA 2008, supra note 98.  
 101.  Flores v. Reno, Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
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benefits to immigrants, such as the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”), cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and other 
forms of relief.102 If a person is no longer here within the United States 
but is warehoused in another country, then all other parts of the INA 
which enable immigrants to apply for and be granted relief are 
frustrated. Under the canons of statutory interpretation, all provisions 
of a statute are to be read consistently, if possible, and interpretations 
which render other statutory sections surplusage or a mere nullity are 
to be avoided.103 To interpret the INA to allow for any arriving alien 
who arrived from a contiguous territory to be “returned” without 
regard to the procedural safeguards and relief available in the INA 
would lead to absurd results and undermine the intent of Congress 
when it passed the Act as a whole.104 
C. Further options available to Mexico or other countries 
seeking redress 
Thus far, this article has not considered options that an individual 
country may have when facing migrants who are being returned to their 
territory. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there simply may 
be a lack of knowledge of what exactly is transpiring on the ground. 
Mexican or Canadian authorities may not be advised specifically about 
“returns” and neither the INA nor the implementing guidance to date 
has any provisions for advising other nations, with the exception of 
local bilateral agreements, mentioned supra.105 It also presupposes that 
the governments of the contiguous territories would perceive the 
returns as their problem or an issue that they could or would want to 
have redressed. The situation is compounded further by the complex 
relationships between governments at or near the border. Countries 
 
 102.  Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13701; Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013). 
 103.  See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against 
surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the 
same statutory scheme.”); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997) 
(“Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect.”); INS v. 
Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 
(1979) (“In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used.”). 
 104.  Congressional intent in the context of immigration laws is not limited to just 
immigration enforcement, but also encompasses family unity, the granting of benefits, 
protection of those seeking asylum, as well as crime victims and others. See KURZBAN, supra 
note 40, at 3–33 (discussing history of immigration laws). 
 105.  See Updated U.S.-Mexico Local Repatriation Arrangements, supra note 81. 
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invariably work together in various capacities at the border: in law 
enforcement, to combat drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, in 
resolving matters of trade and other commercial matters. To make 
matters more uncertain, the future of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) is unclear. 
If migrants’ rights are violated in Mexico, the government of 
Mexico could file a petition with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. Part of the Commission’s duties include issuing 
member states with recommendations that if adopted could further the 
cause of protection of migrants’ rights. Moreover, the Commission 
could request that a state take “precautionary measures” such as the 
suspension of INA § 235(b)(2)(C) returns in the case of the United 
States. The Commission also could refer a case to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, but importantly the U.S. would first have to 
accede to its jurisdiction since it has not accepted blanket authority. 
The Commission also could ask the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights for an advisory opinion. 
Other remedies may be available dependent upon the procedures 
in place in each international legal instrument. Several human rights 
treaties have provisions allowing for a State Party to complain to a 
relevant body, the Human Rights Committee, about alleged violations 
of the treaty by another State Party.106 In the case of the United States, 
it has issued numerous reservations with respect to the ICCPR, for 
example, but still is bound by the treaty as a State Party.107 In the 
reservations, it is worth noting, the United States “declares that it 
accepts the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and 
consider communications under Article 41 in which a State Party 
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the 
Covenant.”108 Because the ICCPR is part of international law and has 
been ratified, it is the supreme law of the land, and applies to all 
government entities and agents including all state and local 
governments in the United States.109 On other fronts, the United States 
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 108.  Id. 
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under President Trump’s administration recently withdrew from talks 
on the Global Compact for Migration.110 In addition, the United States 
has never ratified or signed onto the 1990 International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families.111 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A little-known provision of the INA, the contiguous territories 
provision, is now poised to be implemented by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security in a more expansive way. This 
change has the power to alter the face of immigration enforcement. It 
could be used to return anyone, under the expanded understanding of 
expedited removal, found within the U.S. within two years of entry no 
matter where they may be encountered in the United States.112 If a 
person entered the U.S. from Mexico or Canada there is now a real 
potential danger of her being returned to that contiguous territory 
without any judicial oversight. The possibility for abuse of this 
important provision cannot be overstated. This article has laid the 
groundwork for thinking about how a litigant would go about making 
a claim in federal court with a habeas petition and on other grounds to 
challenge such a return. This represents a new area of litigation, which 
the federal courts will have to grapple with as a matter of first 
impression. The stakes could not be higher where immigrants’ due 
process rights are implicated and, in certain cases, where their very 
lives and well-being will be at risk if returned to a contiguous country 
pending removal proceedings in the United States. 
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